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Abstract 
The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated 
by "distributive" and "informational" theory. One important source of disagreement 
between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can 
engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the 
pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on 
whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate fed­
eral expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel 
activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of 
legislative organization. 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOM Y OF FEDERAL OUTLAYS * 
R. Michael Alvarez Jason Saving 
1 Introduction 
Much has been written in recent years about the legislative organization of the United 
States Congress. Mayhew (1974:81-82) summarized a consensus among political scientists 
when he wrote that "the organization of Congress n1eets remarkably well the electoral 
needs of its members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried to 
design a pair of An1erican national assemblies with the goal of serving members' electoral 
needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed to improve on what exists." That 
is to say, the Congress is organized with precisely the structure most desired by its 
members. 
While virtually all previous work has accepted this intuition, there is a remarkable 
lack of agreement on the precise nature of this structure. Distributive theorists assert 
that legislators seek to maximize their probabilities of reelection through the acquisition 
of federal funding, and that Congress is organized to facilitate this acquisition (Shepsle
and Weingast 1984). Informational theorists, on the other hand, assert that legislators 
seek to make informed decisions through the acquisition of expertise, a.nd that Congress is 
organized to promote this acquisition a.nd thwart distributive activities (Krehbiel 1991:7). 
If the Congress is characterized by distributive theory, then, legislators will affect the 
geographic distribution of federal outlays through political influence. But if the Congress 
is characterized by informational theory, legislators will be either unwilling or unable to 
exercise such influence. 
In testing the distributive theories, it has proven difficult to acquire data on federal 
spending at the congressional district level. These data limitations have pushed empiri­
cists to examine the related issue of universalism in legislatures. In general, theorists have 
found that legislators motivated by distributive concerns would form collective logrolls 
*We thank Kenneth Bickers and Robert Stein for access to their "U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs
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and then give unanimous approval to those logrolls (Collie 1988a, 1988b; F iorina 1981; 
Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 
1981 ) . Using readily available information on recorded votes, empiricists have failed to 
find evidence of universalism, and this failure has led previous work to question the rele­
vance of distributive motivations in legislatures (Stein and Bickers 1994). However, it is 
important to note that the presence of distributive motivations in Congress would not by 
itself imply universalism. Thus, while previous work has rendered a verdict on many of 
the extensions to distributive theory, it has not refuted the hypothesis that distributive 
motivations affect government spending. 
In this paper, we examine the extent to which legislators are able to affect the com­
position of federal spending across districts. We provide a systematic examination of 
the effects of committee membership on federal outlays to congressional districts in the 
lOlst Congress (1989-1990), both in terms of total new outlays and in terms of functional 
policy areas of new outlays. We do this with a newly available dataset of federal outlays 
to congressional districts, a dataset which goes much further than past approaches to 
mapping federal outlays to specific congressional districts.1 We find considerable evi­
dence that congressional committees and politics play a major role in the allocations 
of federal benefits across congressional districts. In our conclusion we argue that this 
provides support to distributive models of congressional organization. 
2 Committees and the Pork Barrel 
The institution most often discussed in legislative organization is the Congressional com­
mittee. As Fenno pointed out, "committee membership, in other words, is not an end in 
itself for the individuals. Each member of each committee wants his committee service 
to bring him some benefit in terms of goals he holds as an individual congressman. And 
he will act on his committee in ways calculated to achieve such goals" (Fenno 1973, p. 
1). So, to the extent that reelection figures as a prominent goal for members (Mayhew 
1974), committee membership will be used for electoral ends. 
In an important work of distributive theory on the structure of Congress, Weingast 
and Marshall (1988) begin with the assumption that each reelection-minded legislator 
wishes to obtain distributive benefits for his constituency but confronts a congress whose 
members are indifferent to his welfare. Clearly, there are gains from trade which can 
be extracted in this situation in the form of a legislative logroll. Weingast and Mar­
shall demonstrate that the comn1ittee system of Congress is 011e institutional solution to 
the collective problem of extracting these gains from trade. Then, to test these asser­
tions, Weingast and Marshall discuss some evidence a.bout the operation of committees 
in the contemporary Congress: that members self-select onto committees; that members 
are so-called "preference outliers"; and last, that "committee members receive the dis­
proportionate share of the benefits from programs within their jurisdictions" (p. 149). 
Evidence exists in the literature in support of each assertion. 2 
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Krehbiel (1991) has offered an informational framework which challenges much of 
Weingast and Marshall (1988). He begins with the assumption that committees exist 
to reduce the amount of uncertainty legislators have about the ramifications of public 
policies rather than to facilitate the acquisition of distributive benefits. To buttress 
his theoretical critiques of the distributive framework, Krehbiel provides provocative 
counter-evidence against some of the assertions of Weingast and Marshall. Specifically, 
he argues strongly against the self-selection and "preference outlier" assertions (Krehbiel 
1990, 1991; but see Hall and Grofman 1990). But Krehbiel does not test the assertion 
that committee membership permits legislators to obtain distributive benefits. So to the 
extent that the distribution of federal benefits is influenced by committee membership, 
important evidence in support of the distributive model and against the informational 
model would be provided. 3 
2.1 Measuring the Pork Barrel 
Substantial disagreements exist among empirical studies concerning distributive poli­
tics. In analyses of some domains of federal political-economic activities thought to be 
conducive to distributive politics, like rivers and harbors expenditures (Ferejohn 1974), 
science projects ('Wilson 1989), defense (Goss 1972), and federal grants programs (Arnold 
1979; Friedland and \!\Tong 1983; Holcombe and Zardkoohi 1981; Plott 1968; Rich 1989; 
Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975; Strom 1975), authors have found evidence of pork-barrel 
spending. Some studies have also looked at the effects of distributive benefits on electoral 
outcomes, with some success (Alvarez and Schousen 1993; Feldman and Jondrow 1984; 
Mebane 1992). But there have been studies which have not found empirical support for 
political manipulations of distributive benefits (Anagnoson 1980; Chernick 1979; Gist 
and Hill 1984; Rundquist 1978; Rundquist and Griffith 1976). However, we argue that 
much of the empirical controversy can be traced to three problems with the empirical 
operationalization of distributive benefits. 
One important question in the empirical controversy concerns the basic operationaliza­
tion that constitutes a. distributive benefit. lFrom a theoretical perspective, distributive 
benefits represent federal spending obtained through the use of political influence. One 
obvious method for determining distributive benefits is to calculate the amount by which 
each district's receipts exceed those of the average district. If legislators consider only 
political influence in the allocation of federal spending, the degree to which a district's 
spending exceeds the average a.cross districts might be an appropriate measure of dis­
tributive benefits. If legislators place any value on economic efficiency, however, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the distribution of federal spending would reflect the merit of 
each district if legislators had no incentive to pork-barrel. In this case, the appropriate 
measure of distributive benefits is the extent to which a district's spending exceeds the 
level it deserves. That is, both the influence of a legislator and the merit of his district 
affect expenditures, and the omission of district merit would bias empirical results in a 
negative direction. 
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The second issue concerns the means by which spending is implemented. In general, 
legislatures allocate funds through either specific projects or general formulae. Most 
previous work suggests that pork-barreling will occur with projects but not with formulae 
(Stein and Bickers 1994; for a contrary view, see Weingast and Moran 1983). If formulae 
programs are not susceptible to distributive motivations, aggregation of formulae with 
projects would also bias empirical results in a negative direction. Whether or not this is 
the case, institutional factors are likely to exert differential effects on project and formulae 
spending. Therefore, a failure to separate these types of spending from each other would 
bias empirical results in an unknown direction. 
A third problem is the distinction between previous outlays and new�outlays. Much 
of the funding that the government spends in a given year was authorized in previous 
sessions of Congress, and there is no reason to believe that current legislators influenced 
legislation in years during which they were not members. If we were to look only at total 
outlays, or continuing outlays initiated earlier, we might be biasing our results toward the 
null hypothesis that politicians do not influence federal outlays to congressional districts. 
For example, if we were to exa.n1ine total outlays in a particular district in 1990 for some 
program, the total moneys allocated would be the sum of the continuing awards still 
in existence as well as new funds being a.warded that year. If this program had been in 
existence since 1983, and ha.cl been allocating funds to this district since then, the awards 
granted in earlier yea.rs might have been influenced by other congressional incumbents, 
or the same incumbent in a different situation. Therefore, in this example, we would 
run the risk of demonstrating the null hypothesis, even if the current incumbent were 
working very successfully to win the new awards in 1990. 
2.2 Member Motivations and the Pork Barrel 
There a.re several theoretical questions that relate to the legislators themselves. The 
first concerns the extent to which representatives are motivated to obtain distributive 
benefits. In general, previous work in the distributive framework assumes that legislators 
are vote-maximizers who fulfill this goal through the acquisition of distributive benefits. 
However, there is abundant evidence that legislators value personal goals as well as votes.4 
While it seems clear that legislators seek reelection, previous work has erred in equating 
the desire for reelection with the maximization of votes. Legislators who consistently 
defeat their opponents by large margins a.re likely to achieve reelection whether or not 
they seek distributive benefits for their constituents. For this reason, we believe that 
legislators will not exhibit uniformly high levels of effort with regard to pork-barreling. 
Under the assumption that legislators ca.re most about pork when their electoral margins 
are low, congress1nen from marginal districts will devote a great deal of their time to 
the acquisition of distributive benefits, while legislators from "safe" seats will devote less 
time toward this end. 
Another question concerns the extent to which the constituents of a representative will 
reward distributive benefits with votes. It is uniformly assumed in the literature that 
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distributive benefits will increase the popularity of a. representative. However, there is 
a. significant amount of anecdotal evidence that some voters dislike distributive benefits.
Niou and Ordeshook (1985) address this concern with the observation that, in a situation 
where all other legislators a.re engaged in pork-barrel spending, it would be foolish for 
a district to elect someone philosophically opposed to pork-barreling. After all, such an 
individual cannot end the collective logroll, so the only means by which he can lower the 
total a.mount of distributive benefits approved by the congress is to abolish his district's 
share of the logroll. While this argument is powerful at a theoretical level, it ignores the 
possibility of national tides and should in any event be tested rather than assumed. 
Thus, there have been important measurement and specification problems in much 
of the earlier research on distributive politics. While we cannot in this pa.per say that 
we have resolved all of these empirical problems, we do believe that the empirical work 
in the next two sections of this pa.per takes a step in the correct direction. In the next 
section, we discuss the data. we employ in our preliminary analyses, as well as the general 
specification of our model of distributive benefits. 
2.3 The Empirical Model 
As stated earlier, the simple measurement of distributive benefits a.cross congressional dis­
tricts has bedeviled much of the earlier work in this area.. There have been few systematic 
examinations of distributive politics largely since there has been no widespread attempt 
to a.mass the huge quantity of data. required to look closely at the distribution of federal 
outla.ys and expenditures at the district level. Instead, researchers have relied upon case 
study approaches which examine pork-barrel politics in certain programmatic areas (i.e., 
rivers and harbors [Ferejohn 197 4)) or which look at more general aggregated measures 
in certain yea.rs (Alvarez and Schousen 1993; Feldman and Jondrow 1984). However, clue 
to the collection of the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Data.base (Bickers and Stein 
1993), scholars now have access to an a.ma.zing data. resource which breaks many of these 
constraints. Not only does this data. collection currently span a. number of yea.rs (1983-
1990), it also contains program-level aggregation of federal outla.ys to the congressional 
district. 
In this pa.per, we use the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Data.base for the yea.rs 
1989 and 1990. We choose this time period for three reasons. The first is that it spans 
only one election cycle, so we do not have to take into consideration possible reciprocal 
causation between some of the political variables we employ in the model and the outlays 
to clistricts.5 The second is that we plan this pa.per to be a. preliminary analysis; given the 
massive quantity of data in the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Data.base, dealing 
with two yea.rs of data. was a. large computational problem. Third, being the most recent 
yea.rs in the series, much of the data. we needed to collect in addition to the federal outlays 
data was easily accessible. 
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More specifically, though, we focus only on what we call new outlays to the district. 
F irst we need to discuss new outlays as they are defined in the U.S. Domestic Assistance 
Programs Database. A new outlay in this data does not mean that a new program 
ha.s been initiated; it means that it has only been reported with in the past year as 
the beginning of a new a.ward, and it gives the a.mount of money which the government 
has announced as being allocated for the congressional district.6 We focus only on new 
outlays in the remainder of this paper since we believe that new outlays would be most 
influenced by contemporary politicians. 7 For this simple reason alone, we feel that our 
empirical work using this new source of data should be a vast improvement over earlier 
studies. 
Additionally, we make an effort to model both the "merit-based" and political pro­
cesses which might be at work in influencing the distribution of new outlays across con­
gressional districts. F irst, this means trying to specify the non-political determinants of 
outlays to congressional districts. To do so, we turned to the U.S. Census, which reports 
demographic aggregates at the congressional district level for all districts following the 
redistrictings of the early 1980's. In the models we report in this paper, we focus on six 
of these demographic aggregates: % Blue Collar ·workers in the district, % Farmers in 
the district, District Median Family Income, % Home Owners in the district, % Senior 
Citizens in the district, and % of the population living in urban areas. These particular 
demographic attributes were chosen since they account for all of the sorts of non-political 
formulaic factors which would influence new outlays to congressional districts available 
in the U.S. Census. 
Then, for the political determinants of new outla.ys we turned to data. in Politics in 
America, various yea.rs. From there, we obtained data on ea.ch member of Congress 
during 1989 a.nd 1990.8 There a.re a. number of factors which might allow some members 
of Congress to obtain benefits for their districts better than their rivals. One of these 
factors is seniority in Congress, which we measure simply by the date when the member 
first entered the U.S. House. Quite simply, the more senior a. member is, the better 
able he or she should be to pla.y the pork-barrel game in the House. Another factor is 
partisanship, with the majority party's members possibly being better able to obtain new 
outlays for their constituents than Republicans. Vve include a. dummy variable coded 1 
in our models for Democrats, a.nd coded 0 for Republicans. 
Next, we have three electoral variables in the model which we must mention. They 
reflect our concern with modeling the possible political demands for distributive benefits 
which might a.rise from constituents. First, it might be true that some constituencies 
are more interested ,,in.--cliBtribut.ive .. benefits-- thanNothers; we" model-this possibility by 
including a. variable measuring the percentage of voters in the district who supported 
Bush in 1988. This is a. rough measure of the district's ideology, which we feel ma.y 
express the district's propensity to desire pork. The second electoral variable is simply 
the incumbent member's electoral vote total in 1988. The purpose of this variable is to 
see if more electorally vulnerable members clip more readily into the pork barrel than 
safer members of the House. The third variable is the amount of donations from PAC's 
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the member received in the 1988 election. Our hypothesis here follows some recent work, 
which has indicated that members supported by PAC's seem to be more likely to pursue 
the pork than other men1bers (e.g. Mebane 1993). 
Of course, one of the most important institutional perks a member can possess is 
committee membership. Accordingly, most of the rest of the discussion in this paper will 
revolve around committee members and their ability to obtain benefits for their districts. 
Here we confine our examination to members of two distinct types of committees in the 
U.S. House: prestige committees (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means) 
and constituency committees (Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marine, 
Public Works, Science, Small Business, and Veterans' Affairs). The distinction between 
prestige and constituency co1mnittees is discussed fully in Smith and Deering (1990): We 
include dummy variables in our models for membership on each of these committees (1 
if a member, 0 if not). The remaining committees are excluded from our analysis (policy 
and unrequested committees) since there is little reason to suspect that members will 
desire membership on those committees to obtain distributive benefits for their district 
(Smith and Deering 1990). 
The committee membership variables provide the important tests for the distributive 
model. Since distributive theory predicts that members seek committee positions to 
reap the possible gains from trade in the legislative arena, we expect that members of 
constituency and possibly prestige committees will obtain more distributive benefits for 
their districts than non-members. It is this positive effect of committee membership 
which we will examine closely in our empirical models in the next section. 
3 The Political Economy of the Pork Barrel 
The first set of models which we discuss are presented in Table 1. Here we estimate 
three regression inodels; the first model has total new outlays, the second has total new 
project grants, and the third has total new formula grants as their respective dependent 
variables. Project gra.nts a.re defined as "a.lloca.tions, using discretionary methods of 
project selection, for fixed periods on specific projects or for the delivery of specific 
services" while fonnula grants a.re defined as "allocations . . . in accordance with a 
distribution formula prescribed by law or administrative rule" (Bickers and Stein 1993, 
p. 9). We present models using both grant variables since we believe that the former
should be the most susceptible to political influences (being discretionary), while the 
latter should not be very susceptible to politics. 9 
In Table 1, we first begin with the political influence varia.bles.10 \i\Thile both seniority 
and previous electoral vote a.re correctly signed across the three equations (the earlier a 
member arrived, the more tenure, and the more outlays; the higher the past Vote, the 
lower the outlays), neither reaches statistical significance. The PAC receipts variable, 
also, is not significant. However, the partisan variable is correctly signed, indicating that 
Democrats do seem to obtain more from the pork barrel than do Republicans. This is 
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only statistically significant in the total outlays model, but it does near significance in the 
new formula grants model. Last, the measure of district demand for pork, the percentage 
who voted for Bush in the 1988 election, is also correctly signed in each equation: the 
higher Bush's percentage of the vote in 1988, the lower was the level of new outlays, new 
project grants, and new formula grants in succeeding years. This effect is significant in 
the first two models, and we interpret this to mean that districts which are liberal desire, 
and receive, more outlays than conservative districts. 
Next to the meat of our discussion - whether membership on the prestige and con­
stituency committees of the U.S. House matters for distributive politics. As we discussed 
earlier, there is some contention about the role of committees in the contemporary House, 
and therefore it is important that we take some time discussing these results. In Table 1, 
we have grouped the prestige and constituency committees together; the prestige com­
mittees appear first, followed by the constituency committees. And our results are quite 
interesting. Beginning with the prestige committees, one clear result jumps out of the 
table: the importance of membership on the Ways and Means committee. Membership 
on this committee has a. positive and significant impact in each model. Interestingly, the 
effect of Ways and Means membership is greater for new formula grants than it is for new 
project grants, which is counter to our expectation than political manipulation should be 
greater for projects than for formulaic spending programs. That Ways and Means mem­
bers seem to obtain so much distributive goodies is not an altogether surprising result, 
given that this committee controls a. large pa.rt of the "power of the purse." Notice that 
membership on the other power committees does not have the same systematic effects; 
if anything, membership on Appropriations and Budget committees seems to influence 
positively both new project and new total outlays, but not to the same extent that Ways 
and Means membership does. 
Now we turn to the constituency committees. If there is pork barreling going on in the 
U.S. House, this is where we might expect to find it happening. As far as a set of these 
committees are concerned, distributive politics is alive and well in the contemporary U.S. 
House. 
Four committees stand out in these models a.s being places where members seem to be 
obtaining the most new outlays: Armed Services, Interior, Sma.11 Business, and Veterans' 
Affairs. Of these, perhaps the most surprising is that the Armed Services members seem 
successful in obtaining new a.wards for their district. This is surprising, since defense 
outlays are not included in the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Database. That 
members of the other committees a.re successful, though, comes as little surprise, since 
these are committees with·jurisdictions·over·progra1T1swhich-directly�would benefit their 
constituents. Also, we are quite surprised to find that there is some variance in the 
influence of committee membership across project and formulaic program initiations. 
The effect of being on the Armed Services, Interior, and Small Business committees is 
roughly twice the magnitude on formula. grants a.s on project grants. We had expected 
to find that little, if any political influences on formula grants would exist, since by 
definition they a.re progran1s which a.re not discretionary. It would appear that House 
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members have managed to find ways to influence these non-discretionary programs from 
their positions on these committees. 
The null findings, also, are quite surprising. That members of the Agriculture, Mer­
chant Marine, Public Works, and Science committees do not seem able to obtain more 
new outlays than members off those important constituency committees runs counter to 
past research. Especially puzzling are the results for Agriculture and Public Works, both 
of which would be considered classic pork barreling committees in past research. We have 
two possible accounts for these findings. One is that, after controlling for membership on 
other committees, other sources of political influence, and non-political influences on the 
flows of new outlays to congressional districts, perhaps membership on these committees 
is not all that it is cracked up to be. The other explanation is more satisfying, however: 
perhaps the nature of the committees, their power over programs, or their membership, 
has changed dramatica.lly in recent years so as to make these committees not as success­
ful in obtaining more new outlays for their own districts as they were in the past. Both 
accounts require more research. 
One problem with these models, though, is that the measures we use are highly ag­
gregated. The measure of total new outlays, for example, contains moneys allocated 
to income security programs, employment programs, and programs aimed at improving 
the business climates in local areas. Thus, while committee members may actually in­
fluence the flow of new outlays in certain programs under their jurisdiction, they may 
be unable or unwilling to influence the flows of other outlays under the jurisdictions of 
other committees. If this were true, looking only a.t aggregated expenditures might mask 
considerable evidence of distributive politics being played in specific programs. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Database, 
moreover, is that it allows us to disaggregate new outlays into a number of specific pro­
gram categories, which we can then link directly to committee jurisdictions. Following 
the results in Table 1, we have looked at five committees and new outlays disaggregated 
to program types. First, following up on the results regarding the Ways and Means Com­
mittee, we looked at the effects of membership on this important prestige committee for 
new total outlays, new project grants, and new formula grants across twelve program 
types: agriculture, business and commerce, disaster relief, education, employment and 
training, energy, environmental quality, health, income security and social services, nat­
ural resources, science and technology, a.nd transportation. The regression model here 
is identical to that discussed earlier, except here the only committee dummy variable is 
for Ways and Means membership. For the sake of space, we report only the coefficients 
on the Ways and Means dummy va1;iable, and denote the statistical significance of each 
coefficient.11 These are reported in Table 2. 
It is clear in Table 2 that there are some program types which Ways and Means 
members appear able to influence relative to the other members of the House: agriculture, 
business and commerce, employment and training, energy, and environmental quality. 
Unlike the general result in Table 1 that the constituency committees seemed more 
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influential on formulaic grants than on project grants, here it looks like the Ways a.nd 
Mea.ns members a.re more influential on project gra.nts than formula. grants, especially 
in these pa.rticula.r policy a.rea.s. But, in the other policy areas, most of the coefficients 
cannot be distinguished from zero. These a.re very interesting results, since the Ways 
and Means committee is not normally thought of as a. committee from which members 
engage in the trafficking of distributive benefits. In fa.ct Fenno found in Congressmen 
in Committees that Ways and Means members valued their committee positions first for 
influence and prestige, second for policy interests, and last for reelection concerns. It is 
clea.r tha.t some cha.nge in Ways a.nd Means member interests must have occurred in the 
intervening years since Fenno's study. 
The other four committees we examined are all constituency committees - Interior, 
Science, Space and Technology, Small Business, and Veterans' Affairs. We looked a.t 
these specific committees for two reasons. First, from the results in Table 1 they looked 
to be ones which members in the contemporary House might be using for obtaining 
distributive benefits for their districts. Second, they a.re a.lso committees with jurisdic­
tions which closely resemble some of the policy a.reas in the U.S. Domestic Assistance 
Programs Da.taha.se - natural resources (Interior), science (Science, Space a.nd Tech­
nology), business and commerce (Small Business), and employment, labor a.nd training 
(Veterans' Affairs). Accordingly, we estimated models with total new outlays for each 
of these four program types. The independent variables a.re identical to those discussed 
above, a.gain with the exception that here we include only one committee dummy vari­
able on the right-hand side of ea.ch model; the committee which we believe matches the 
program type. The results of these regressions are in Table 3. 
Importantly, it is obvious that membership on ea.ch of these committees does lead to 
a higher level of total outlays in ea.ch respective program type. All of the coefficients 
on the committee membership dummy variables a.re positive, and three are sta.tistica.lly 
significant. The coefficient for membership on the Veterans' Affairs committee in the 
employment, labor and training model is positive, but is only slightly greater than the 
estimated sta.nda.rd error. Yet we can conclude that membership on these committees 
ha.s a positive and in most cases significant impact on the flow of new outlays in specific 
types of programs to the districts of members. We have also shown similar results for 
most of these committees (and a few others not examined here) in terms of total new 
outlays, new project grants and new formula. grants. Additionally, we have shown that 
membership on prestige committees also has a. positive and often strong influence on new 
flows of federal outlays to congressional districts. 
4 Discussion 
Our empirical results for the lOlst Congress have interesting implications for students 
of Congress and of policy ma.king. First, and most important, it does look as if, even 
under the serious constraints imposed by the new budgeting procedures of the 1970s and 
1980s and the looming budget deficits, members still find wa.ys to funnel federal moneys 
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to their constituents at home. In the political economy of the pork barrel, three results 
were prominent: that more new outlays tend to go to more liberal districts; that more 
new outlays tend to go to Democratic members; and that more new outlays tend to go 
to members of prestige and constituency committees. Two null results are also worth 
reiteration. One was that member electoral safety seemed to matter little in our models, 
with members from more electorally marginal districts obtaining roughly the same level 
of new outlays a.s safe members. The other was that PAC contributions did not lead 
members to seek more pork; but this conclusion clearly needs more study (e.g. Mebane 
1993). Thus, the pork barrel is a.live and well, even after many changes to the process of 
budgeting in recent years. 
A second conclusion relates to the project-formula distinction. In contrast to con­
ventional wisdom, we find evidence that formulaic spending is significantly impacted by 
pork-barreling. In fact, distributive motivations appear to have a greater impact on for­
mulaic spending than project spending. A direct explanation for this phenomenon is 
that formulae a.re composed by legislators in committees. Therefore, they write into law 
formulae which will benefit their district even though the funds will often be allocated by 
"independent" agencies. An indirect explanation relates to Congress' ability to oversee 
executive agencies; in situations where the precise geographical destination of federal 
spending is left to the agency, bureaucrats might reward influential members in exchange 
for lax supervision. Vve suspect that both of these factors pla.y a role in the "formula 
pork-barrel." 
It should be noted that the House does not by itself determine the spatial distribu­
tion of federal outlays in the United States. Federal spending decisions a.re the result 
of a complex game involving a number of actors, including the House, the Senate and 
the President (Wright 1973; Crain and Tollison 1977). The relative importance of in­
stitutional factors in the House render it uniquely suited to empirical analysis, and the 
relatively small size of House districts suggests that House members face uniquely power­
ful incentives to use their institutional positions to affect the spatial distribution of federal 
outlays. However, future work can and should examine the extent to which institutions 
other than the House affect federal outlay decisions. 
Our results have important implications for the distributive and informational theories 
of legislative organization. Since we have seen a lot of evidence in our results which 
indicates that some committees a.re trafficking in distributive benefits, it cannot be the 
case that all committees, all of the time, a.re pure and simple providers of information 
a.bout the potential effects of policies to the House floor (e.g. Krehbiel 1991). But neither 
did we find massive quantities of evidence to indicate that all important committees 
in the House are pure providers of pork to their members. In fact, we have evidence 
which lends support to both sides, which calls for theoretical models to explain which 
committees might be more prone to distributive and which to informational politics. 
Finally, our work seems to indicate that some important changes have ta.ken place in 
the U.S. House since the classic studies of committees and pork-barreling. That members 
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of the Ways and Means committee seem to i'eceive more distributive benefits than most 
of their colleagues does not mesh with the classic notion of this committee as a "prestige" 
committee - a place where sa.fe n1embers go because they want merely to be important 
members of Congress. This finding, and many of the other findings presented above, calls 
for further examination. 
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Table 1: Total New Outlays, New Projects, and New Grants, 1989-1990 
Independent 
Variables New Outlays New Project Grants New Formula Grants 
Constant 25.4** 26.6** 27.1 ** 
.78 .91 2.17 
Seniority -.0009 .0002 -.009 
.005 .006 .01 
Previous Vote -.003 -.004 .0009 
.003 .003 .007 
PAC Receipts 88 .00000 .00000 -.00000 
.00000 .00000 .00000 
Democrats .16** .08 .19 
.09 .10 .24 
Bush Vote 88 -.01 ** -.02** -.01 
.004 .005 .01 
Appropriations .14 .20* -.15 
.12 .14 .32 
Budget .19* .17 -.03 
.13 .15 .35 
Rules -.05 .33* -.32 
.21 .24 .57 
Ways and Means .30** .25* .54* 
.14 .16 .38 
Agriculture -.13 -.37** -.12 
.14 .16 .38 
Armed Services .22** .35** .39 
.12 .14 .32 
Interior .33** .45** 1.11 ** 
.13 .16 .37 
Merchant Marine -.03 .10 .05 
.12 .14 .35 
Public Works .004 -.10 .003 
.12 .13 .32 
Science .04 .12 .03 
.12 .14 .33 
Small Business .21** .29** .64** 
.12 .14 .33 
Veterans .19* .40** .42 
.14 .17 .39 
% Blue Collar -.09** -.12** -.14** 
.007 .009 .02 
% Farmers -.06** -.06** -.09** 
.02 .02 .05 
Median Family Inc. -.0001** -.0001** -.0001 ** 
.00001 .00001 .00004 
% Home Owners -.003** -.003** -.006 
.005 .005 .01 
% Senior Citizens -.05** -.07** �.11** 
.01 .01 .03 
% Urban -.02** -.02** -.02** 
.003 .003 .008 
1989 Dummy -.25** -.13** -1.39** 
.07 .08 .19 
Adjusted RY .26 .29 .14 
Ivlean (SE of Reg.) 17.l (.98) 15.9 (1.14) 14.5 (2.72) 
Note: The dependent var1able rn each model 1s logged. Ent.nes are regression coefficients, with their 
standard errors below. * p= .05 ( one-t.ai led), and ** p= .01 (one-tailed). 
Table 2: Ways and Means Members and New Outlays by Program Type, 1989-1990 
Program 
Type New Outlays New Project Grants 
Agriculture .67* . 77** 
Business and Commerce .34* .55** 
Disaster Relief -.18 .05 
Education .19* .02 
Employment and Training . 72** .46* 
Energy .63** .45 
Environmental Quality .76* .72 
Health .23 -.03 
Income Sec. and Soc. Services .32* .15 
Natural Resources .32 .32 
Science and Technology -.48* -.48** 
New Formula Grants 
.23 
-.01 
.03 
.20 
.72* 
.22 
1.06* 
.71** 
.07 
.49 
Transportation -.09 .16 .14 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients on a dummy variable indicating membership on the Ways 
and Means Committee, with their standard errors below. * p=.05 (one-tailed), and ** p=.01 level 
(one-tailed). (The regressions from which these results were obtained are available from the authors, 
and are virtually identical in their specification to those reported in Table 1.) 
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Table 3: Total New Outlays for Natural Resources, Science, and Small Business 1989-
1990 
Independent New Outlays New Outlays New Outlays New Outlays 
Variables Nat. Res. Science Small Business Employ. and Train. 
Constant 26.7** 31.2** 21.7** 32.3** 
2.34 1.63 1.53 2.44 
Seniority -.01 -.01 -.01 -.03** 
.01 .01 .009 .01 
Previous Vote -.0002 -.01 ** -.005 -.007 
.008 .006 .005 .009 
PAC Receipts 88 .00000 .000001 ** -.00000 .00000 
.00000 .000000 .00000 .00000 
Democrats .27 -.20 .16 .12 
.26 .18 .17 .27 
Bush Vote 88 -.02* -.02** -.02** -.05** 
.01 .009 .008 .01 
Interior .93** 
.38 
Science .58** 
.23 
Small Business .37* 
.23 
Veterans' Affairs .44 
.42 
% Blue Collar -.16** -.18** -.07** -.18** 
.02 .02 .01 .02 
% Farmers -.19** -.17** -.03 -.03 
.05 .03 .03 .05 
Median Family Inc. -.0001 ** -.0001 ** - .0001 ** - .0002** 
.00004 .00003 .00003 .00005 
% Home Owners .02* -.02** .02** -.01 
.01 .009 .009 .01 
% Senior Citizens -.09** -.10** - .05** -.18** 
.03 .02 .02 .03 
% Urban -.04** -.04** -.01 ** -.02** 
.008 .006 .005 .009 
1989 Dummy -3.71 ** -.40** -1.36** -.49** 
.21 .14 .14 .22 
Adjusted R" .31 .23 .13 .16 
Mean (SE of Reg.) 11.8 (3.02) 12.8 (2.10) 14.1 (1.98) 11.7 (3.17) 
Note: T he dependent variable in each model is logged. Entries are regression coefficients, with their 
standard errors below. * p=.05 (one-tailed), and** p=.01 (one-tailed). 
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Endnotes 
1 For additional discussion of the measurement problems in past research on pork-barrel expenditures 
to congressional districts, see Alvarez and Schousen (1993), Feldman and Jondrow (1983) and Mebane 
(1993). 
2For the first assertion, the standard references are Fenno (1973), Rohde and Shepsle (1973), and 
Shepsle (1975, 1978). For the assertion that members of committees are "preference outliers" see Fenno 
(1973). For the assertion that members of committees receive a disproportionate share of benefits see 
Arnold (1979) on major projects, Cohen and Noll (1991) on high technology benefits, Ferejohn (1974) 
on public works projects, and Weingast and Moran (1983) on the Federal Trade Commission. 
3Krehbiel realizes the importance of this point. In his conclusion he argues that "the proper inference 
from our findings is that legislators care about distributional and informational benefits. However, due 
to preeminent positions on uncertainty in the policy environment and majoritarianism in procedural 
choice, legislators are more severely constrained in obtaining distributional benefits than is suggested in 
most theoretical research" (p. 260). Still, our argument holds - to the extent that we can show that 
committee membership matters in the flow of federal outlays to districts, we are providing important 
evidence in support of distributive models of congressional organization. 
4Fenno [1973], for example, enumerates no less than five motivational forces for legislators. 
5We are currently working on such a model, however. As will soon be discussed, there are reasons to 
believe that distributive benefits to a district will be influenced by the political preferences and electoral 
actions of a member's constituents; and that distributive benefits will also influence that member's 
standing in his or her district. This suggests reciprocal causation, a factor which has not been taken 
into consideration in the empirical studies we have discussed. 
6Bickers and Stein describe a new award as follows: "what distinguishes a new award from a continuing 
award is that the former is reported only at the time a given project commences and immediately follows 
the announcement of the grant" (1993, p. 17). 
7 Another point to make in passing is that by focusing only on new awards we are removing from 
the data all a.wards which were reported as only being aggregated to the county level. While the U.S. 
Domestic Assistance Programs Database does include these expenditures extrapolated to the district 
level, they make no attempt to divulge whether they are new or continuing awards at the district level. 
8There were a series of congressional districts which we excluded from the analysis. Typically, the 
incumbents were removed from office, or left office, during this particular cycle. The districts are CA 
15, FL 18, NJ 1, NJ 12, MS 5, TX 12 and TX 18. 
9We have not separated true discretionary spending from true entitlement outlays. Interestingly, by 
focusing only on new outlays we have eliminated most entitlement outlays a priori. For, many if not 
most of the major entitlement programs (like social security or AFDC) are often reported as outlays to a 
county, and not by specific outlay, due to the high numbers of specific outlays. Bickers and Stein (1993) 
used a coding· rule· ·which· makes ·no at·tempt ·to ·determine"•.v-hether··an ·outiay·aggregated to the county 
level was a new outlay; for any outlay which we cannot assign to a new or existing outlay, we eliminated 
it from our analysis. So, most entitlement outlays will not be included in the results we report here. 
Since entitlements reflect ongoing financial commitments by the federal government to individuals, we 
believe they should not be programs prone to pork barrel activities. 
10 Also, we must note that the outlays variables in all of our models are in logs. If a district is recorded 
as receiving no new outlays in the year, we recode that district as having t.he minimum dollar amount 
of new outlays in that year. Second, we include a dummy variable for 1989 to control for the possibility 
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of differential intercepts across these two years. 
11The regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
17 
5 References 
Alvarez, R. M. and Schousen, M. M. (1993). Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expec­
tations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting. American Politics 
Quarterly 21: 410-428. 
Anagnoson, J. T. (1980). Politics in the Distribution of Federal Grants: The Case of 
the Economic Development Administration. In B. S. Rundquist, Political Benefits. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Arnold, R. D. (1979). Congress and the Bureaucracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Bickers, K. N. and Stein, R. M. (1993). U.S. Domestic Assistance Programs Database. 
Mimeo. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. 
Chernick, H. A. (1979). An Economic Model of the Distribution of Project Grants. In P. 
Mieszkowski and W. H. Oakland, Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid. Washington, 
D.C.: Urban Institute. 
Cohen, L. R. and Noll, R. G. (1991). The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institute. 
Collie, M. P. (1988a). Legislative and Distributive Policy Making In Formal Perspective. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 13: 427-458. 
Collie, M. P. (1988b ). Universalism and the Parties in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
American Journal of Pohtical Science 32: 865-883. 
Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. (1977). The Influence of Representation on Public Policy. 
Journal of Legal Studies 6: 355-361. 
Feldman, P. and Jondrow, J. ( 1984). Congressional Elections and Local Federal Spend­
ing. American Journal of Poti:ti:cal Science 28: 147-163. 
Fenno, R. F. (1973). Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Ferejohn, J. A. (1974). Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1941-1968. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
F iorina, M. P. (1981 ). Universa.lism, Reciprocity, and Distributive Policymaking in Ma­
jority Rule Institutions. In J. Crecine, ed. Research in Public Policy Analysis and 
M�anagement, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Friedland, R. and Wong, H. (1983). Congressional Politics, Federal Grants, and Local 
Needs: Who Gets What and Why? In A. M. Sbragia., The A1unicipal A1oney Chase: 
The Politics of Local Government Finance. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
18 
Hall, R. L. and Grofman, B. (1990 ). The Committee Assignment Process and the Condi­
tional Nature of Comrnittee Bias. American Political Science Review 84: 1149-1166. 
Holcombe, R. G. and Za.rdkoohi, A. (1981) . The Determinants of Federal Grants. South­
ern Economic Journal 48: 393-399. 
Gist, J. R. and Hill, R. C. (1984). Political and Economic Influences on the Bureaucratic 
Allocation of Federal Funds: The Case of Urban Development Action Grants. Journal 
of Urban Economics 16: 158-172. 
Goss, C. F. (1972). Military Committee Membership and Defense-Related Benefits in 
the House of Representatives. Western Political Quarterly 25: 215-261. 
Krehbiel, K. (1990 ). Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers? 
American Political Science Review 84: 149-163. 
Krehbiel, K. (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: Univer­
sity of Michigan Press. 
Lowi, T. (1964). American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory. 
World Politics 15: 677-715. 
Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Ya.le University 
Press. 
Mebane, W. R. (1993). Congressional Campaign Fina.nee and the Pork Barrel. Mimeo. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. 
Niou, E. and Ordeshook, P. (1985 ). Universalism in Congress. American Journal of 
Political Science 29: 246-290. 
Plott, C. (1968). Some Organizational Influences of Urban Renewal Decisions. American 
Economic Review 58: 306-321. 
Rich, M. J. (1989). Distributive Politics and the Allocation of Federal Grants. American 
Political Science Review 83: 193-213. 
Rohde, D. A. and Shepsle, K. A. (1973). Democratic Committee Assignments in the 
House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process. American 
Political Sdence Review 67: 889-.905. 
Rundquist, B. S. (1978). On Testing a Military Industrial Complex Theory. Anierican 
Politics Quarterly 6: 29-53. 
Rundquist, B. S. and Ferejohn, J. A. (1975 ). Observations on A Distributive Theory 
of Policy-Ma.king: Two American Expenditure Programs Compared. In C. Liske, W. 
Loehr, and J. McCa.mant, Comparative Public Policy. New York: John Wiley. 
19 
Rundquist, B. S. and Griffith, D. E. (1976). An Interrupted Time-Series Test of the 
Distributive Theory of Military Policy-Making. Western Political Quarterly 24: 620-
626. 
Shepsle, K. A. (1975). Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model 
with Institutional Constraints. Public Choice 22: 55-78. 
Shepsle, K. A. (1978). The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in 
the l\1odern House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Shepsle, K. and \i\Teingast, B. (1981). Political Preferences for the Pmk Barrel: A Gen­
eralization. American Jo1trnal of Political Science 25: 96-111. 
Smith, S. S. and Deering, C. J. (1990). Committees in Congress, second edition. Wash­
ington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
Stein, R. and Bickers, K. N. Universalism and the Electoral Connection: A Test and 
Some Doubts. Political Research Quarterly, forthcoming 1994. 
Strom, G. (1975). Congressional Policy Ma.king: A Test of a Theory. Journal of Politics 
37: 711-735. 
Weinga.st, B., Shepsle, K. , and Johnsen, C. (1981). The Political Economy of Benefits 
and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics. Journal of Political 
Economy 89: 642-664. 
Weinga.st, B. R. and Marshall, \iV. J. (1988). The Industrial Organization of Congress: 
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political 
Economy 96: 132-163. 
Weinga.st, B. R. and Moran, NI. J. (1988). Bureaucratic Discretion or Legislative Con­
trol? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political 
Economy 91: 765-800. 
W ilson, R. (1986). An Empirical Test of Preferences for the Political Pork Barrel: District 
Level Outlays for River and Harbor Legislation, 1899-1913. American Journal of 
Political Science 621-649. 
Wright, G. (1974). The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric 
Analysis. Review- of .Economics and Statistics-56: 30-38. 
20 
